Review on the Perspective of Logistics Service Supply Chain Reputation

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Abstract

Based on the development of service economy in the tertiary industry, this paper introduces the status quo and dilemma of the development of logistics service industry, and uses the literature review to study the academic research hotspot of logistics service supply chain. Finally, how to solve the logistics service supply The reasons for the poor chain incentive effect, and the quality incentives of the logistics service supply chain are analyzed, and the effects of related explicit and implicit incentives are compared. Finally, the implicit incentives have good effects and solutions. Many problems in the development of logistics service industry have provided new research ideas for the development of logistics service industry and brought new vitality.

Keywords

logistics service supply chain; reputation effect; incentive mechanism.

1. Introduction

Under the background of the development of informationization and economic globalization, the industrial structure of the world has gradually changed from "secondary industry economy" to "third industry economy", and the service economy represented by "third industry economy" is in Chinese nationals. The proportion of the economy has increased year by year and has become one of the biggest investment hot spots. Along with the rapid development and growth of China's service-oriented economy, the logistics industry, which has developed more prominently in the service-oriented economy, has been highly valued by the government in recent years. Relevant logistics policies are often promulgated to guide and support the logistics service industry from a policy perspective. development of. At the same time, with the gradual improvement of industrial status and continuous improvement of the business environment, the supply-side structural reform of the logistics industry also has better conditions. The direction of the future development of the logistics industry will be to promote the logistics industry to reduce costs and increase efficiency, promote the transformation and upgrading of the logistics industry, enhance the overall development level of the industry, and enable the logistics industry to better serve economic and social development.

2. Research Direction of Logistics Service Supply Chain

China's logistics industry has continued to develop, and the logistics economy has also increased year by year. China's logistics economy has made important contributions to the enhancement of comprehensive national strength, improvement of people's livelihood and economic system reform, and has played a major role in industrial upgrading, circulation industry reform, and development mode transformation. Relying on the continuous advancement and development of science and technology, some new modes, new technologies and new formats such as modern supply chain, smart logistics, multimodal transport, carless transport, joint distribution, pallet sharing, and trailer leasing are accelerating, and artificial

intelligence technology is researched and developed. The logistics service supply chain is booming under such a wave. It can effectively translate the needs of integrators into business services with value attributes, thus promoting the release of service output value in the logistics service supply chain[1]. At the same time, the resource integration and service outsourcing modes in the logistics service supply chain form the value relationship of the logistics service supply chain, which is also the source of the value creation of the logistics service supply chain. And as a joint carrier of logistics industry and service industry, logistics service supply chain has become a hot issue in academic circles in recent years. Scholars' research on logistics service supply chain mainly focuses on supplier selection, interest coordination, performance evaluation, quality supervision and incentives.

2.1.   Overview of Supplier Selection and Interest Coordination

In terms of supplier selection, Wang Wei studied the supplier mediation innovation sharing as a mediator variable, and established a model of supplier mediation to influence the performance of firms. It proved that supplier innovation can positively influence the enterprise to achieve sharing[2]. Feng Chengyu and Wang Zongjun studied the integrators' adoption of the wholesale price and subsidy price to promote the provider's reliable subsidy. By constructing the Stackelberg game model, the reliability cost coefficient has a positive impact on the supply chain[3]. Yang Song, Zhuang Jincai, etc., build a game model of safety production quality evolution between providers and integrators, and analyze the cost-benefit conversion of quality and safety to the quality of both parties, thus eliminating the existence of "free-riding" in the quality of agricultural products[4]. In the research on supplier interest coordination, Lancome conducted in-depth research on rural professional cooperatives. Based on the analysis of the development status of rural cooperatives, Lancome explored the construction measures of agricultural product supply chain interest coordination mechanism, which has strong practical value[5]. Zhu Xi and Sun Tianyu conducted in-depth research on the conflict of interests between enterprise channels, and constructed a wholesale price contract and operation contract, which can effectively solve the shortage of goods and inventory problems[6].

2.2.   Summary of Supply Chain Performance Evaluation and Quality Supervision and Incentives

In the research on supply chain performance evaluation, Wang Jian studied the funding problem of e-commerce platform, and based on the analysis, gave relevant optimization suggestions, which can effectively solve the multi-faceted problems in the development of supply chain finance[7]. Cheng Dong and Sun Yingxi studied the impact of customer participation and customer evaluation on fast-selling products. The analysis shows that interpersonal relationships and customer participation can present relevant curves, so that the impact can be predicted according to relevant trends, and finally the effect of performance evaluation is achieved[8]. As for quality supervision and incentives, Zhang Cuihua and Peng Peng designed a multi-cycle cooperative game model of integrator-led revenue, and analyzed how to optimize service quality supervision and integrity cooperation ability under the quality punishment strategy, thus effectively solving the logistics service supply chain. Quality supervision and collaboration issues[9]. Li Jing and Ge Zhiyi studied the quality supervision of agricultural products in China. Based on the current quality problems of agricultural products, the paper puts forward a perfect quality supervision system and gives relevant countermeasures to effectively solve the related supervision problems of agricultural products[10]. Liu Yuan and Wu Shuang studied the quality incentive contract considering short-term economic benefits and long-term economic benefits, which can effectively deal with the quality incentive problem of complex product supply chain, and also provide research ideas for quality incentives[11]. Wang Qian and Xie Chunyu studied the quality incentive problem of two-level supply chain under asymmetric information. Based on the unilateral moral hazard and bilateral moral

hazard, four principal-agent models were established to analyze the impact of each situation on quality incentives[12].

3. New Ideas for Quality Incentive Research

Through combing the supply chain and logistics service supply chain related research, we can find that the quality supervision and incentive related research of logistics service supply chain is the focus of research field. This is in fact that the quality of logistics is frequent in recent years, and the quality management of related enterprises is not sufficient. There are big reasons. How to effectively stimulate the quality of the supply chain and improve the operational efficiency of the logistics service supply chain has become the core topic of the enterprise and the government. The design of relevant incentive mechanisms has emerged in an endless stream, but the mechanism that can effectively solve the problem has lost its relevance over time. Incentive effect, therefore, related issues, this paper sorts out the research on logistics quality incentive mechanism, and puts forward relevant research ideas and directions.

3.1. Summary of Explicit Incentives

At present, domestic and foreign scholars study the incentive mechanism from different angles, mainly divided into explicit incentives and implicit incentives. In terms of explicit incentive mechanism, the main factors mainly considered by the explicit incentive mechanism include quality, cost, and profit. Foreign studies on the supply chain incentive mechanism started earlier, and Holmstrom and Milgrom first began to study the incentive mechanism under information asymmetry[13]. Thonemann et al. studied the incentive mechanism of market sales for asymmetric information[14]. Domestic scholars have also conducted extensive research in related fields. Shi Dan and Li Yongjian studied the contradiction between production and demand, and compared the incentive mechanism of income sharing contract and compensation contract, and improved the revenue sharing contract to achieve supply chain coordination[15]. Wang Wenbin and Zhao Xuejuan studied the impact of low-capacity recyclers and high-capacity recyclers on the closed-loop supply chain under the dual information asymmetry in the principal-agent framework[16].

3.2. Overview of Implicit Incentives

In terms of implicit incentive mechanism, the study of reputation effect is also a more prominent direction in recent years. Foreign scholars have established the KMRW reputation model, which has a foundational role in the study of reputational effects. For example, the repetitive game model is used to study the reputation mechanism in the literature[17-19]. Later, scholars conducted more comprehensive and systematic research. Cao Qilong and Zhou Jing constructed an optimal dynamic incentive contract model combining explicit and implicit incentives, which proves that the implicit incentive mechanism that introduces the reputation effect can strengthen the investor's efforts[20]. Based on reputation theory, Zhu Xiaofeng and Ye Xuting constructed an optimal dynamic incentive model combining the explicit and implicit incentives of the lower and upper levels of government. The reputation effect has a positive impact on the behavior of the lower and upper levels through internal and external effects[21].

In summary, in the supply chain, the incentive mechanism has a unique advantage as a way to solve the incentive conflict and achieve supply chain coordination, and the effect is relatively good. At the same time, considering the implicit incentive mechanism of reputation effect, because of its periodicity and dynamic characteristics, it is more suitable for the application of service industry. Therefore, considering the reputation effect in the incentive mechanism of logistics service supply chain is a feasible direction.

4. Summary

In recent years, with the rapid development of the service industry, the logistics service industry has gradually expanded in the economic proportion. With the support of economic development and supply-side structural reforms, various logistics service companies have sprung up and developed rapidly. However, the quality of logistics services is mixed. Therefore, how to properly stimulate the quality of logistics services among the participating parties in the logistics service supply chain has become a hot topic in academic research.

This paper combs the relevant research literature, and compares the effects of various incentive methods. It gives the quality incentives from the perspective of implicit reputation effect incentives, which can effectively solve related problems and become a very important researcher in the future research of logistics service supply chain quality incentives. Effective and reliable direction. At the same time, relevant research ideas can also bring reference value to relevant enterprises, and provide a practical and meaningful reference for the development of China's logistics service industry.

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