

Research on the Advantages and Disadvantages of Khrushchev's Agricultural Management System Reform

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Abstract

agriculture has always been one of the major problems in the Soviet union. During the Khrushchev administration, he tried to reform the Soviet union's agricultural management system. It is not only of great academic value, but also of practical significance to summarize and evaluate Khrushchev's agricultural management system reform in a fair and objective way. In particular, it is of great reference and enlightenment to the agricultural economic development of other socialist countries to deeply study the causes and lessons of its failure.

Keywords

Khrushchev; Agriculture; Management system; reform.

1. Introduction

Agricultural problems has always been one of the major problems of the Soviet union, Stalin priority development of heavy industry, agricultural development lagging for a long time, although Soviet agriculture already realize collectivization, also reached quite high degree of mechanization, but in the 1950 s, the Soviet union's food production has been before the first world war level, this stage of the Soviet union agricultural production level and even lower than the level of 1913, per unit area yield is the 1/3 of other European countries average yields only, it seriously affected the People's Daily life and the normal development of social economy. The problems in the development of Soviet agriculture attracted Khrushchev's great attention. He realized the disadvantages and shortcomings of the agricultural management system brought by the collectivization of agriculture implemented in Stalin's period. After Khrushchev came into power in the 1950s, he took a series of measures to reform the agricultural management system by taking agriculture as the breakthrough. The reform of agricultural management system is the entry point of Khrushchev's economic reform and an important part of his economic reform.

On the evaluation of Khrushchev's agricultural management system reform, scholars have many opinions, among which lu nanquan is the most representative one. Lu Naquan spoke of, in his book about the rise and fall of the Soviet union history from Khrushchev agricultural reform direction and actual effect of view, in 1958, for industry, reform can be divided into two stages, the reform before 1958 mainly to carry out the principle of decentralization and material interest stimulation, reform basic was a success, since 1958, the agricultural policy mainly to receive power, to issue an executive order to lead the development of agricultural economy, many policy seriously infringe the interests of farmers. In the article "how to evaluate the reform in Khrushchev's period", lu nanquan said that Khrushchev's economic reform itself has many aspects that should be affirmed. He made a correct and decisive decision to carry out the reform of the agricultural management system as soon as he took office.

The main contents of Khrushchev's agricultural management system reform are as follows: the agricultural planning system reform with power expansion as the main content; The reform of agricultural product purchasing system with the main purpose of improving material benefits; Reform of personal sideline management system; Reorganization of machine tractor station; To reform the remuneration system of collective farms; Experimental promotion of mechanization contract labor contract production group; Reclaiming the wilderness, expanding the production of corn and animal products to surpass the United States. Khrushchev's reform ideas are two: one is to delegate power; Second, the principle of material interest stimulation. In January 1954, for example, Khrushchev to the presidium of the Soviet communist party entitled "the way to solve the problem of food", put forward the cultivation plan, he forecast to expand the area sown to grain will bring benefits, and points out that the land reclamation plan already can produce more food, and to stop farmers pay tribute and taxes ", won the domestic suffer from long-term pay tribute and taxes "collective farm hardworking, supported by a large number of cadres. In March 1954, Khrushchev made at the plenary session of the central committee of the communist party of the Soviet union "report and resolution on further expanding grain production in the Soviet union and on reclaiming uncultivated and cultivated land", and finally adopted the resolution, which stipulated that at least 13 million hectares of uncultivated land should be redeveloped from 1954 to 1955.

2. Advantages of Khrushchev's Agricultural Management System Reform

2.1. Encourage the Development of Personal Sideline and Enhance the Autonomy of Farmers in Operation

In developing collective and state farms, for farmers, did not own the land, what also have no decision on the land farming power, encourage the development of personal side, to a certain extent brings certain democracy, because in fact is on loan to a quarter of hectares of land, the people themselves have the right to decide how to use, country no longer intervene directly in a region of the people's life. Hope to be able to get a piece of vegetable or fruit orchards, this is not just the demand of the small towns and rural workers, who subsequently in big cities are allowed in the country side of the road, the trees, and some land along the railway, as a vegetable or fruit orchards among its staff, this is the beginning of the so-called collective garden workers, the workers can in their spare time and came here to work on general holidays. It is of great significance to allow farmers to cultivate their own gardens beside their houses, and to allow them to raise their own livestock and poultry. Before 1958, the Soviet union encouraged the development of personal sideline, and the state supported the development of personal sideline on the policy level, which led to the rapid development of personal sideline. From 1953 to 1958, there was a great increase in personal sideline: potatoes and vegetables increased by 14.3 percent, the number of head of cattle increased by 25.3 percent, the production of meat and milk increased by 33 percent and 27 percent respectively, and fruit increased by 46 percent. In 1953, only five million farmers had cows. By 1959, almost every family had cows.

2.2. The Cultivated Land Area was Expanded and Grain output was Increased

During the first half of Khrushchev's reign, he encouraged the expansion of farmland and achieved remarkable results. For example, from 1954 to 1958, the area of arable land reclaimed in Siberia reached 9.6 million hectares, accounting for 26% of the reclaimed land in the whole Soviet union, exceeding the national plan. The newly cultivated land greatly increased the area sown for agriculture. According to statistics, from 1954 to 1964, the area sown in Siberia increased from 22,251,000 hectares to 27.067 million hectares, among which western Siberia increased by 74.2% and eastern Siberia by 59%. With the expansion of

cultivated land area, the agricultural output value also gets rapid growth. From 1954 to 1959, agricultural output grew by an average of 70 percent a year, and whole-grain production increased by about 50 percent.

2.3. Reform of the Income Distribution System to Increase Farmers' Income

After Khrushchev came into power, he took a series of measures to reform the income distribution system and increase the income of peasants in order to mobilize the enthusiasm of peasants. Khrushchev's measures mainly included: raising the purchase price of farm and livestock products, directly increasing the income of farms and farmers; Implement the national unified purchase system to narrow the income gap of the collective farmers in the republics of the Soviet union; Gradually relax or even cancel the compulsory sale system; Write off past debts of the farm; In the aspect of income tax to the farm to implement preferential, increase the farm loans, extend the loan period. Relevant statistics show that in 1953 the farm to the state and the cooperatives from the sale of farming and animal husbandry products for more than forty rubles, for more than three times the 1953, 1960 in production increase in half, income increased more than twice, so that producers from the sale of agricultural products more cash income increased by 7.54 billion roubles. In the decade from 1952 to 1962, the incomes of collective farmers across the Soviet union nearly tripled.

2.4. The Autonomy of Local Agricultural Enterprises in Operation has been Expanded

Before and after Stalin's death, the Soviet union's planning and agricultural management rights were basically centralized in the central government. One of the important contents of Khrushchev's agricultural system reform was to modify the over-centralized agricultural planning system and expand the autonomy of local agricultural enterprises. After the collectivization of agriculture, the proportion of state farms in the whole agricultural economy of the Soviet union was increasing, and the scale of state farms and collective farms was also expanding. The central government has a very large administrative power, covering all the details, severely restricting the autonomy of farmers and local agricultural enterprises. To solve this problem, Khrushchev took corresponding measures. First, the Soviet state farm sector was merged with the Soviet ministry of agriculture to expand its scope of management. Second, the republics and localities would regain their authority to organize production activities, the ministry of agriculture would be reduced, and the Soviet agricultural sector would be reorganized from top to bottom. Furthermore, the main responsibilities of the Soviet ministry of agriculture were clearly defined. The main task of the department of agriculture was to take charge of technical education in agriculture, and to train professional and technical personnel in agriculture to improve the agricultural development of the whole country. Under Stalin, the Soviet system of agricultural planning was highly centralized. Some of the state regulations on state farms and collective farms were detailed, detailed and detailed. The central committee of the communist party of the Soviet union took into account such production targets as yield per unit area, total output, planting structure, planting area, methods of operation, various agronomic measures and how agricultural products should be distributed. A highly centralized system of agricultural planning does not allow state farms and collective farms to develop local agriculture according to local conditions, such as soil, climate and level of economic development. In 1955, the central committee of the communist party of the Soviet union made a relatively bold reform of the domestic agricultural planning system. For state farms, collective farms and machine tractor stations, the state only stipulated the quantity of livestock products and agricultural products to be purchased. Collective farms and state farms had great power to make their own production plans according to local conditions. This means that the process of formulating agricultural plans

has been changed. After the reform, the state planning commission first summarized the production plans of state-owned farms and collective farms, and then formulated the agricultural production plans of the whole Soviet union based on the previous summary. The change from top-down planning to bottom-up planning has a positive impact on local initiatives.

3. Disadvantages of Khrushchev's Agricultural Management System Reform

3.1. Policies are Changeable and Inconsistent

Khrushchev had rich practical experience in the process of handling agricultural work, but his theoretical accomplishment was relatively short, coupled with his strong subjective will and lack of binding force, so it was difficult for him to choose a correct direction for reform. For example, in the process of reforming the purchasing system of agricultural products, the following measures were implemented in the early stage, such as: raising the prices of agricultural and livestock products; We will establish a unified system for purchasing grain. The positive effects of these measures are very obvious, especially the implementation of the system of raising the purchase price of agricultural products, which has greatly enhanced the enthusiasm of farmers in production and their income accordingly has been greatly improved. However, after the appearance of "ostentationism" in 1958, Khrushchev resumed the policy of high purchase by administrative means, requiring farmers to sell high amount of agricultural products, which damaged the practical interests of farmers and violated the principle of material interests once proposed. For example, Khrushchev encouraged the development of personal sideline business and implemented a series of supporting policies at the very beginning of his reform, and the grain harvest in 1958 was finally bumper. But due to some problems appeared in the process of development of sideline, the farmer has spent much of the effort, to some extent, ignored the collective farm work, can meet all that Khrushchev is considered a public economy, personal side has lost its meaning, and thus limit one side, on the farmer's production enthusiasm again by the blow. But in 1961 Khrushchev again began to talk about developing a personal sideline and punishing those who were keen to abolish the garden. Such capricious policy changes have seriously undermined trust in his reforms. The reforms lacked the necessary stability, changed frequently, lost credibility with the people and caused a lot of confusion.

3.2. The Interests of Cadres Directly Responsible for Agricultural Work have been Damaged

During the period of Khrushchev, he carried out the reform of the cadre system, especially the reform of the cadre renewal system, which violated the interests of many people. Khrushchev did not take this issue into full consideration or make corresponding arrangements, which led to him facing extremely severe challenges in the subsequent process of implementing the reform. Some aspects of Khrushchev's reform of the cadre system were closely related to the immediate interests of the cadres directly in charge of agricultural work. For example, he stipulated that the party secretaries at the primary level should serve a term of one year and be elected for no more than two consecutive terms. As a result, the party secretaries at the primary level should be replaced too frequently, and the rate of change increased from 30%-35% to 60% each year. The capacity and adaptability of the cadre team are limited. They are replaced and transferred too frequently, which leads to the insecurity of the majority of cadres and the instability of the cadre team. The loss of support from the cadre ranks was one of the important reasons for Khrushchev's downfall. And in the process of agricultural reform, due to personal decisions without thoughtful, Khrushchev has the tendency to aggressive,

reorganization involves the range is very wide, including from the ministry of agriculture, agriculture, large and medium-sized agricultural institutions to test station, a set of government agencies, and even the ministry of agriculture from Moscow moved to the countryside, the agricultural department of a large number of cadres and workers lost in the capital relatively comfortable working environment. Rural conditions are relatively poor compared with urban areas, and large-scale relocation without preparation has resulted in the loss of a large number of agricultural workers, including agricultural experts. Khrushchev in the agricultural reform of this kind of approach, for the agriculture itself, is a disaster, many agricultural cadres strongly opposed, so in this case, even if the correct agricultural reform program, also difficult to get the following implementation and success

3.3. Reform Measures Lack Scientific Proof

Khrushchev's agricultural reforms lacked scientific justification, and policymaking by the seat of one's senses often took place. For example, in the reorganization of the machine tractor station, the reorganization work was actually completed in a vigorous campaign, although many considerations were given in advance. The collective farm began buying farm equipment for the machine tractor station in the spring of 1958, but the reorganization was almost complete only a year later. But in fact, most farms do not have enough money to buy machines, except for a fairly small number of large farms. Many farms spend a lot of money to complete the "administrative order" to buy machines, which seriously affects the financial arrangements for the coming year. Moreover, in terms of the time schedule, the reform was carried out too hastily, and some negative consequences were generated one after another. For example, although the collective farm made every effort to buy technical equipment, it had no technicians to operate, manage, maintain and repair after the purchase. Equipment underutilization, backlogs and damage are common. Another example is that Khrushchev, after visiting the American pastures and farms, was surprised to find the role of corn, so he thought that the Soviet union needed to improve the structure of the feed crops, and on returning to China, he vigorously advocated the planting of corn throughout the country. In 1953, the planting area of corn in the Soviet union was only about 3.5 million hectares. By 1954, it had increased to about 1.5 million hectares. By 1955, it had increased to about 1,800 hectares. Maize cultivation results are closely related to local climate, soil and artificial management conditions. But Khrushchev was still not satisfied with this result, and without a specific analysis of the actual situation in each region, he enforced by executive order the expansion of corn planting area throughout the Soviet union. By 1960 corn acreage had reached 28 million hectares, and by 1962 it had increased to 37 million hectares. In many places, corn is simply not suitable for planting, and the forced planting has had an impact. The reclamation movement has a similar problem. One of the most convenient and effective ways to increase grain output is to expand the area of grain cultivation. The original cultivated land of the Soviet union was limited, but there was still a lot of uncultivated and uncultivated land, so the method of cultivating wasteland may achieve certain results in a short time. However, in the actual process of planting, requirements are very high, need comprehensive and scientific arrangement of land reclamation area, take the necessary protective measures to appropriately control the scale of the reclamation, speed, otherwise will cause massive soil desertification in reclamation area, the phenomenon of wind erosion and water erosion, has KenHuangDe use value will also be greatly affected. Due to the haste in the operation process, the negative impact was inevitable in the end, and "corn fever" even became the laughing stock of Khrushchev.

4. Conclusion

The question of reform of the agricultural management system was raised by the Soviet union at the highest levels of the party leadership, not in public opinion, while the inhabitants kept in mind these measures long and eagerly. In the face of the contradictions between ideology and popular will, the first thing the government had to do was to keep the Soviet system rock-solid. Khrushchev's agricultural policy to some extent achieved a balance between the two, because he realized that agriculture first needed new technologies, new techniques and new cadres, and that the combination of the three within the socialist economic system should ensure the reality and long-term development of agriculture.

The reform of the agricultural management system in Khrushchev's period has both successful experience and failed lessons, and has left much to be thought about. Although Khrushchev made a strong impact on the Stalinist model in the process of agricultural reform, he only made some modifications to the problem of the Stalinist model at a shallow level, but did not touch the most fundamental problem of the Stalinist model. Among them, the most important reason is that the reform of agricultural management system is not supported by strong theories. Furthermore, the reform of agriculture is only a minor repair without touching its institutional roots, and it does not respect the development law of agriculture itself.

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