

# Research on Deviation and Correction of Public Policy Implementation under "Double Carbon" Target

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## Abstract

Energy conservation and emissions reduction and energy consumption of the double control as to realize the objective of "double carbon" double catch means, central to make a series of policy, but in practice, the policy of local government is influenced by many subjective and objective factors show that the phenomenon of policy implementation of block, in order to realize indicators, taking "one size fits all" electricity, not only affect the smooth realization of the policy goals, reduce the efficiency and quality, And even damage the public's satisfaction with the government. Based on the analysis framework "fuzzy - conflict", "electricity" behavior logic as analysis object, explore cause deviation of policy implementation, and put forward the corresponding countermeasures to correct deviation behavior of local government to enforce the ecological environmental policy, maintain the seriousness and authority of public policies, power "double carbon" goal smooth realization.

## Keywords

**Policy Implementation; Power Cut; Fuzzy-Conflict Model.**

## 1. Introduction

The process of public policy mainly includes five aspects: policy formulation, policy implementation, policy evaluation, policy termination and policy supervision. Policy implementation is an important link for the downward implementation of policies after the formulation and promulgation, and it is also an inevitable way for policies to become reality, which is directly related to the success or failure of public policies. Allison, a famous American scholar, once pointed out that in the process of realizing policy goals, 90 percent of the function of policy programs depends on the effective implementation of policies.

The reform of the administrative system in China has greatly aroused the initiative and enthusiasm of the local government. The local government attaches great importance to the reform and innovation in various fields of policy implementation. The quality and level of policy implementation also gradually adapt to the political, economic and cultural development of the country and the society. As an important issue, the policy of energy conservation and emission reduction is a hot spot of theoretical research and social concern. The implementation effect of local government's energy conservation and emission reduction policies will directly affect the level of energy conservation, transformation and environmental quality. However, the effect of public policy implementation is not always good. At present, China adopts the local government responsibility system for emission reduction and energy control. Due to the interaction of subjective and objective factors in the complex social environment, local policy enforcers are prone to deviate in the implementation of public policies, resulting in wide variation in policy implementation effects among different regions. The deviation of policy implementation often leads to a great waste of policy resources, which not only affects the fair distribution of social

public interests, hinders the development of regional economy and society, but also greatly damages the authoritative image of the country and government. It is worth considering how to correct the deviation of policy implementation and ensure the accurate, orderly and efficient implementation of policy to the greatest extent. Therefore, this paper takes the "power cut" behavior that eventually occurs in the implementation and operation of energy conservation and emission reduction policies as the analysis object, sorts out the factors resulting from the deviation, and provides better ideas for correcting the deviation of local governments' policy implementation and better carrying out policy implementation.

## **2. Literature Review and Theoretical Framework**

### **2.1. Research on Western Public Policy Implementation**

As early as the 1960s, the failure in the implementation of the poverty eradication program in the United States made people question the effectiveness of the formulation and implementation of the government's public policies. Why could a good or ideal policy plan fail to achieve its expected policy goals? With these questions in mind, Western policy scientists gradually began to study "policy implementation". In the 1970s, scholars gradually extended their research in the field of public policy from policy decision-making to the implementation of specific policies, and began to pay attention to the key role of public policy implementation in the process of public policy. The research process of public policy implementation in the West can be roughly divided into three stages: the first stage is the "top-down" research path stage represented by Pressman and Wedavsky in the 1970s. The "bottom-up" model holds that public policy decisions are the exclusive prerogative of the highest decision-makers, and people at lower levels of bureaucracy simply act on the decisions. Therefore, the top-down research model is more suitable for analyzing those actions directly introduced by the top level, with clear objectives and contents, and which need to be implemented strictly according to the policy. The research in this stage set off the upsurge of "policy implementation research" and promoted the change of policy research orientation.

In the second stage, the model of "bottom-up" is proposed based on the critical innovation of the first stage. The "bottom-up" model holds that people at lower levels of the policy process are the basis for policy implementation. It emphasizes the role of local governments in the process of policy implementation, overestimates the subjective initiative of local governments in policy implementation, which is easy to lead to unclear powers and responsibilities, unclear rewards and punishments.

The third stage reasonably integrates the first and second stages, and puts forward the "integrated research" model, which holds that the policy implementation process not only covers the control and interaction between the upper and lower levels, but also includes the negotiation and competition with the policy subject within the policy system, and the policy implementation result is formed by the interaction of various variables. The stage revealed the relationship between the government examining internal relations in the process of implementation of public policy and government role, and the public choice theory analysis elaboration to the execution of public policy, this research due to the pursuit of the interests of local government public policy implementation deviation behavior, has a certain theoretical guiding significance. It is highly regarded in current research on policy implementation.

### **2.2. Research on the Implementation of Public Policies in China**

The research on public policy implementation in China lags slightly behind that in the west, and the theoretical research on public policy implementation is gradually rising from the 1980s of the last century. After 1990, the domestic some scholars began to public policy implementation theory and combining the actual situation in our country, and has published some books, such

as Jen-ming Chen of policy science, Ding Huang hysteresis resistance mechanism of the policy implementation and countermeasures", of "introduction to policy science", "gonggong guanli Zhang Jinma public policy analysis. In this process, the research on the correction of public policy implementation deviation has gradually increased, and the research Angle has gradually diversified, and a consensus research framework has begun to emerge and is recognized by most scholars. He Donghang et al. proposed that in order to prevent the "fragmentation" of public policies in the implementation, high-level promotion, hierarchical governance and multi-attribute governance with Chinese characteristics can be used to solve the problems of the implementation and implementation of public policies between central and local governments and departments. Ding Huang believes that the unsmooth implementation of policies stems from the imperfect system design, so it is difficult to correct the wrong behavior of policy implementers driven by interests. Qian Bye-bye and others put forward that the subject of policy implementation will often implement the policy passively and inefficiently due to their own attitude, quality and ability. Chen Zhenming believes that policy flexibility is an inevitable phenomenon of policy implementation activities, and the reasons for "policies at the top and countermeasures at the bottom" include the interest contradiction between the central government and the local government, the defects of the policy itself, departmentalism and ineffective supervision. Zhuang Chuisheng divided policy adaptation into four types: self-definition, adjustment, choice and distortion, and pointed out that policy needs and the cost-benefit judgment of policy implementers determine whether and which type of adaptation will occur. Zhou Xueguang analyzed the collusive behavior of grass-roots governments and pointed out that the institutional basis of collusive behavior and its stable existence have direct logical relationship with the unification of national policies. Yang Hongshan established the "path-incentive" analysis framework of policy implementation, and distinguished four modes of administrative implementation, flexible implementation, experimental implementation and symbolic implementation, as well as the conversion mechanism between the modes. Wu slightly less, such as by identifying "pressure type system" and "collectivism culture" of these two kinds of situation in China, Chinese policy implementation process is analyzed and the western classical theory hypothesis, and the revised "fuzzy - conflict" model, the higher pressure, is presented in this symbiotic relationship, to reduce the policy ambiguity and so on three kinds of means to improve the effect of policy implementation.

To sum up, Western countries started to study the effect of policy implementation earlier, and foreign scholars paid attention to the reasons for the poor policy implementation by using theoretical research results. And domestic experts pay attention to the combination of theory and practice to the specific research policy execution, through in-depth analysis environment policy implementation, puts forward the countermeasures and Suggestions on failure, but in the policy implementation process problems of behavior analysis is less, so this article from the local government in the process of energy conservation and emissions reduction in China "electricity" problem as the research object, In view of the deviation caused by the implementation of the "double carbon" target by local governments in China, how to find the way to improve the government governance ability.

### 3. Power Cut Case

Energy conservation and emission reduction are major decisions and arrangements made by the CPC Central Committee and The State Council. Energy conservation and emission reduction have been explicit targets in China's 11th Five-Year Plan since 2006. In each five-year plan period, The State Council has formulated a comprehensive work plan for energy conservation and emission reduction, making overall plans for energy conservation and emission reduction nationwide, and playing an important role in accelerating the green transformation of the

economy and society. The ambitious goal of becoming carbon neutral by 2060. In February 2021, the central government issued guidelines for the first time, proposing to establish a sound economic system of green and low-carbon circular development on the basis of efficient use of resources and effective control of greenhouse gas emissions, to ensure the realization of carbon peak and carbon neutrality targets. A series of major decisions and arrangements have been made in the wake of the "double carbon" combination of resource consumption intensity and total energy consumption to achieve the goal of reducing energy consumption per unit of GDP by 3% and 13.5% during the 14th Five-Year Plan period. In August, the General Office of the National Development and Reform Commission issued a notice on the Barometer of the completion of Dual control Targets for energy consumption in all regions in the first half of 2021. Nine provinces, including Guangdong, Guangxi and Jiangsu, saw their energy intensity rise in the first half of the year. The reduction rate of energy intensity in 10 provinces, including Zhejiang, Henan and Anhui, did not meet the progress requirements in the first half of the year. In some areas, there are still blind expansion of "two high energy" projects and excessive use of energy consumption targets. At this point, the pressure on local governments increased in vain, but energy conservation and emission reduction and energy consumption control have become mandatory targets, which must be completed on time, so the local government decomposed the energy-saving and emission reduction targets downward and finally distributed them to enterprises.

At this point, in September 2021, the annual emission reduction task is nearing the end, Guangdong, Jiangsu, Zhejiang and other provinces, one after another launched the energy saving and emission reduction sprint, a large range of power cuts to pull the switch in order to complete the target. The power cuts, which began on September 10 in Jiangsu, a textile province, are aimed at "dual control of energy consumption". Then extended to the chemical industry, steel and other energy-intensive industries, Nantong, Taizhou, Yangzhou, and many other cities in and outside the province have been spread the news of power rationing. Then the situation suddenly changed, Suzhou, Kunshan also spread the news of power rationing or blackouts, almost no difference in the industry of power rationing, during the implementation of the blackout order, will be switched off to industry, while domestic electricity will be retained, office air conditioning will be stopped. Guangdong Province will implement the "open two stop five" power consumption plan, Zhejiang Province will not shut down the high energy consumption of key enterprises to take measures... In order to cope with the shutdown and power rationing, some enterprises find a new way to buy diesel generators in bulk to maintain production, so that emissions do not fall but rise. More a company in Liaoning due to sudden power rationing, resulting in exhaust system outage, blast furnace gas poisoning accident. These "rash" notices of government departments' power cut not only lasted for a long time, endangering the normal production and operation of enterprises, but also brought serious impact on the normal life of local residents. In order to reduce consumption, all the elevators of a city government building were shut down, and the power was cut for one hour. In a county in northeast China, all street lights are turned off all day long, and lighting such as building lighting and business signs are turned off all day long, which creates safety risks for residents to travel. In some sections of the road, the lights were out, causing traffic jams, and the use of kettles and rice cookers was banned.

## **4. Local Government Implementation Deviation Reason**

### **4.1. Conflicts between Central and Local Objectives under Information Asymmetry**

At present, deviations in policy implementation of all kinds are common in our country, which not only seriously affect administrative efficiency of the government, but also cause great waste

of social resources. It is difficult for the central government to fully understand the specific situation and problem environment of each place. It can only grasp the overall situation from the macro level, while the local government is more clear about the actual situation in the local area. In this case of information asymmetry, local governments will take advantage of the flexibility principle in policy implementation power to refine the central macro policy content into local implementation plan adapted to the local area. In other words, the central government only guides the policy objectives in principle from the macro level, while the local governments are responsible for carrying out reasonable and flexible policy implementation under the principle of the original policy. However, public choice theory holds that local governments themselves are also rational "economic men". As rational economic man, all actions taken by local governments are for the pursuit of their own maximized interests. When their own interests are completely consistent with the interests of the central government, the policy goals of the central government can be fully and effectively realized. When their own interests are different from the interests of the central government, its policy implementation may deviate from the original policy connotation of the central government to a certain extent. Thus, when the power of the central and local configuration change, local governments have the opportunity to use policy executive power to meet its own interests demand, some local governments may be due to the blind pursuit of self-interest maximization, away from the major policies of the central government and damage the fairness of public resource allocation, leading to deviation of policy implementation.

#### **4.2. Competition and Imitation among Local Governments**

In our country, there are competition relations between local governments at the same level, competition leads to imitation, and imitation promotes competition between each other. Chinese local government inter-government competition will be around resources, promotion and other factors. This leaves little room for inter-governmental policy makers to collaborate on the same political and economic issues. The promotion of local government leaders mainly depends on political performance, which mainly depends on the implementation of public policies and the resources obtained through the implementation of public policies. When competition expands, local governments will learn and imitate policies, especially those with similar resources. As a double-edged sword, competitive learning can not only bring about the improvement of the government's management and service ability, but also may produce vicious competition with each other's negative policies. Learn and imitate the good and bad aspects of your competitors to form a "united front". Under the pressure of the dual carbon target, all the competing parties are waiting for other local governments to come up with more scientific, reasonable and optimized specific public policies, but in the process of waiting, they lose the opportunity to implement the regulation step by step. At the end of the index assessment, if local governments face the current situation and choose an unconventional policy implementation method -- power cutting, they can solve the current problems through imitation, even if they cannot fulfill the substantive requirements of the higher government, so as to avoid new problems of assessment and supervision. It is even possible that local governments that adopt unconventional methods of policy implementation can outwardly accomplish tasks and receive praise from their superiors. In this scenario, rational competitors will worry that they are lagging behind their competitors who adopt "one-size-fits-all", so the result of the game is that all parties will choose "one-size-fits-all" power cuts to achieve energy saving and emission reduction targets on time.

#### **4.3. There are Gaps in the Transmission and Supervision Mechanism of Policy Implementation**

The supervision system of the local government mainly includes the supervision within the national political system and the supervision of the social system. However, at present, the



supervision within our government is weak, the professional supervision institutions in society are limited, and the supervision consciousness of the people is not strong, leading to large gaps in the supervision and accountability of the local government policy implementation, and the supervision and accountability system needs to be standardized and improved. Supervision is to use one kind of power to constrain another kind of power, and the supervision of public policy implementation reflects the constraint of supervision power to public policy implementation power. There are many reasons for the current lack of supervision. First, China is a vast country, and it is difficult for the central government to know the specific situation of various places, and the lack of information makes it impossible to implement effective supervision. Second, the local government functional departments are many, and the main implementation is Too many bodies, making the scope of supervision extremely large, difficult to supervise in place; Third, the lack of independence of the supervisors within the government, easy to favor each other, resulting in dereliction of duty of supervision; Fourthly, the current supervision of policy implementation mostly focuses on the results of policy implementation, but ignores the supervision of the process of policy implementation. Local governments only care about the completion of the final task. Fifth, there is no legal guarantee for citizens to carry out democratic supervision, and it is not uncommon for the government to suppress the masses and disregard their opinions. All these reasons make supervision become a form and symbol, and it is difficult to play a real role in policy implementation.

#### **4.4. Local Government Executors have Limited Cognitive Level and Misplaced Values**

In the process of public policy implementation, local policy implementers have some initial power to explain public policies. Only when public policy implementers have high comprehensive quality, can they accurately interpret public policies. It includes grasping the true connotation of public policy, understanding the principle, scope, goal and limit of public policy. In the last stage of assessment to take electricity energy saving and emission reduction behavior, existence of local government executives policy level, the knowledge structure is limited, for the realization of the "double carbon" adopted the policy of energy conservation and emissions reduction goal is clear, but the principles and scope of general and vague, matching policy executors are difficult to formulate policies to in combination with the practical situation of area, Scientific and reasonable allocation and coordination of phased tasks, resulting in chaotic implementation process, policy implementation deviation. Because the implementation of energy conservation and emission reduction policies has value relevance, the implementation of some local governments has always been unable to get rid of the impact of the value concept of the implementation subject. Only the value orientation of energy-saving emission reduction policies are consistent with the value orientation of policy implementation personnel basic, can be practically implemented according to the stated goal of pushing, under the circumstances of market economy system, the local government in China is driven by a material interest, often only pay attention to material and economic interests, is a kind of the value orientation of "the doctrine", blind worship of the pursuit of "visualization" GDP, Results in low efficiency or failure of the implementation effect, the last resort to take the "power cut" remedial index.

### **5. Policy Implementation Deviation Correction Strategy**

#### **5.1. Adhere to the Central and Local Main Body Policy Consistency, Reduce Policy Ambiguity, Improve the Information Transmission Mechanism**

In the process of policy implementation, local government policy executors should not only conform to the central government's major policies, but also meet their own interests. There is

an interest game between them. When their own interests are completely consistent with the interests of the central government, the policy goals of the central government can be fully and effectively realized. When their own interests are different from the interests of the central government, the implementation results may deviate from the original policy intention of the central government to a certain extent, resulting in the deviation of policy implementation. In view of this problem, the solution is to adhere to the principle of policy implementation, central policy formulation should also avoid too vague, let the local government and the central body of the policy connotation consistent. Local government is an important carrier for the state to manage different administrative regions, and an important cornerstone for the healthy development of national politics, economy and society. Under the special administrative system of China, the central government entrusts the local governments to DEAL with the local affairs on their behalf. In essence, local governments implement public policies according to local conditions in order to maximize the realization of the unified policy objectives of the central government. No matter how the game is played, local governments should not only focus on their own interests and fail to fulfill the policy mandate of the central government. If the policy implementation behavior of the local government goes against the main policy spirit of the central government, it will not only lead to the accountability and rectification of the central government, but also impossible to realize the interests of the local government. Therefore, when the local government and central government interest game, behavior of local government policy implementation must be consistent with the main body of the central policy requirements, in the central policy limit within the framework of implementation of public policy, only in this way can we fundamentally prevent the emergence of the policy implementation deviation, can ensure maximum satisfy the interests of the region.

## **5.2. The Central Government Will Strengthen the Coordinated Governance of Regional Emission Reduction, and Local Governments Will Establish Correct Values**

We will strengthen regional mechanisms for energy conservation and emission reduction. Energy conservation and emission reduction are not simply the aggregation of various government indicators. Revolves around energy conservation and emissions reduction of local government competition to a certain extent, played a significant role in achieving double carbon, but "one size fits all" competition between local governments would cause negative effects, therefore may be established by coordinating the interests of the various departments environmental protection coordination leading group, improve the environmental protection coordination, break the barriers between regions, Reducing the "single-handedly" management mode of local governments at all levels not only improves the regional linkage mechanism of horizontal management, but also helps to contain each other among governments, which can effectively restrain each other's competition behavior when making environmental policies. In addition, it is necessary to optimize the input of energy conservation and emission reduction and the structure of system and monitoring personnel, which is conducive to stimulating the improvement of the implementation effect of local government environmental policies. The central government should publicize the examples in time, guide local governments to establish correct values and achievements, and reduce the negative imitation and diffusion among governments. Excessive delay leads to "sports" governance and "emergency" state, and the policy implementation habit of doing nothing in ordinary times and "one-size-fits-all" in urgent times.

## **5.3. Improve the Oversight and Accountability System for the Implementation of Public Policies and Strengthen Constraints on Local Governments**

We will accelerate the improvement of the supervision and restraint system in the implementation of local government public policies. Due to poor information communication

and asymmetric information, the central government is unable to carry out effective supervision over the implementation of local government public policies, which provides opportunities and possibilities for local government policy executors to pursue the interests of regions, departments and individuals, resulting in policy implementation deviation. In order to correct the deviation of public policy implementation, we must perfect the supervision system of public policy implementation. At present, China has initially formed a diversified supervision network in terms of the policy implementation supervision system, but in the actual operation process, the channels for social supervision forces to play a role are blocked, and the "official mutual protection" strengthens the opportunism of local governments to pursue profits through policy deviation. Therefore, we should give full play to the power of social supervision, improve the social supervision system, clarify the status and authority of social supervision, and smooth the channels of public supervision with legal provisions and Internet technology. Secondly, the responsibilities of all parties in the process of policy implementation should be clarified, the scope of responsibility and the method of liability investigation should be disclosed, the implementation cost of "policies above and countermeasures below" should be increased, and the effect of gradual implementation of energy conservation and emission reduction policies should be strengthened.

#### **5.4. Cultivate the Comprehensive Quality of Policy Implementer, and Change the Value of "Materialistic" to "Humanistic"**

When policy executors after fully grasp the connotation and the spirit of the public policy, how to correctly convey the content and implementation of public policy, how to put the combination of principle and flexibility of public policy, how to timely and effectively in the process of policy execution need to integrate and mobilize various resources, to achieve the policy objectives of public policy is a policy priority. Due to the policy implementation process is a complicated system engineering, when insufficient policy executors of organization and management ability, even if in the heart of the central public policy has been fully understand, but can't be combined with the actual situation in our region, to gradually appeared in the process of policy implementation deviation, make public policy cannot play policy in the region. Second, change the values of policy implementers. The goal of local governments in implementing public policies must be the well-being of the people, and the first priority should be to solve the people's livelihood problems. The local government should change the material-centered "materialistic" value concept in the past, embody the "people-oriented" value orientation in every link of the policy implementation process, and make the public policy implementation behavior meet the real needs of the region and the public.

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